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The separation of philosophy from literature and vice-versa is an aspect of early twentieth 
century intellectual sclerosis that affected a particular region of the globe. I am, of course, 
referring to the British/American school of philosophy otherwise known as analytic 
philosophy—or the logico-linguistic turn in philosophy begun by Russell, Lewis, Strawson and 
others, based on a faith in the universal Truth of pure reason critiqued by their own god, Kant. 
Therefore, that contemporary French philosopher, Alain Badiou, would have to invent the term 
“inaesthetics” to refer to the inextricable relation between philosophy and literature, only 
demonstrates how far we have strayed from the course first paved by Plato twenty-five hundred 
years ago—a course that continued well into the nineteenth century and twentieth century with 
thinkers like Nietzsche and Sartre. Nietzsche, for instance, began his academic career not a 
philosopher but as a classical philologist, whose innovative and insightful work on ancient Greek 
and Latin literature, earned him a reputation as the most promising philologist of his time. 
Fortunately for us--and if we take Nietzsche‟s at his words, fortunately for him as well--this 
rising young star of philology who secured a tenured position at the University of Basel before 
completing his doctoral dissertation, became a meteoric falling star, tumbling down to earth in 
luminescent fire, with the controversial publication of his first book, The Birth of Tragedy.  
The academic world vilified The Birth of Tragedy for lacking in scholarly seriousness, 
and for imputing qualities to the dithyramb and the Dionysian and Apollonian “Geist” that had 
nothing to do with the way everyone understood them to function. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-
Möellendorf, the most respected classical philologist of the time, kindly advised the young 
philologist to leave the profession. At which point, Nietzsche ceased to be a philologist to 
become a philosopher; the philosopher of the “gaya scienza,” and the philosopher-poet of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra who would read literature philosophically.   
What follows, then, are some remarks on what Nietzsche had to say about Don Quijote, 
in light of his overall critique of Romanticism. That Nietzsche‟s reading of Don Quijote is part of 
a philosophical project, which often includes a virulent attack on Christianity, is what makes his 
position so important for cultural studies, though not at all for the old sacred cows of Spanish 
philology who go on masticating without anything in their mouths. 
 
Cruel, cruel humor 
Nietzsche, who is often associated with nineteenth century Romanticism, was nothing of 
the kind—or more accurately, that is what he wanted us to believe. But perhaps, the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle, for just as Nietzsche was a “Romantic” insofar as he believed that our 
relation to the world was primarily affective, and inasmuch he valorized the “aristocratic” values 
of a Don Quijote who did battle with the forces of “herd morality,” he was not a Romantic when 
it came to placing any value on the passive, ascetic, and life-denying suffering of a Jesus Christ, 
a Saint Francis, or a Parsifal. And here is where Nietzsche‟s sentimentalism ends and his reading 
of Don Quijote begins.  
Note the anthropological tenor of Nietzsche‟s interpretation of Don Quijote in On the 
Genealogy of Morals--the work Deleuze and Guattari once called “the great book of modern 
ethnology” (1975 192)--where Nietzsche wrote: 
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 [I]t is not long since princely weddings and public festivals of the more magnificent kind 
were unthinkable without executions, torturing, or perhaps an auto-da-fé, and no noble 
household was without creatures upon whom one heedlessly vent one‟s malice and cruel 
jokes […]. Consider, for instance, Don Quixote at the court of the Duchess. Today we 
read Don Quixote with a bitter taste in our mouths, almost with a feeling of torment, and 
would thus seem very strange and incomprehensible to its author and his contemporaries; 
they read it with the clearest of conscience in the world as the most cheerful of books, 
they laughed themselves almost to death over it. (1969 #6: 66)
1
   
 
A number of factors underpin Nietzsche‟s interpretation of the way Don Quijote was read 
in the seventeenth century in contrast to the way it was read in the nineteenth, and perhaps 
continues to be read today. Firstly, Nietzsche reminds us that what we “today” consider 
objectionable, horrific practices (e.g. torture and public executions) were once thought of as 
pleasurable forms of entertainment. Consider for a moment the pre-Christian Roman circus and 
its audience, which could joyfully witness the violent death of others without the slightest degree 
of guilt. Once we even kept all kinds of animals around the house so that we could vent our 
malice on them, says Nietzsche. Laughter, and not simply humor, was a result of our human, all 
too human enjoyment of cruelty. When readers of the famous Spanish novel read of its 
protagonist„s “crazy” doings, “they laughed themselves almost to death over it,” writes 
Nietzsche. In short, for seventeenth century readers, Don Quijote was not the Romantic hero, 
who foolishly fought in the name of long forgotten ideals, and who stood for our aspirations to 
be more than we are, but a fool deserving of derision. For, who in fact, was Don Quijote, if not a 
madman? And one did little else but to laugh at the mad. He was certainly not the representative 
hero of Spanish idealism. No madman, regardless of his/her temporary lucidity, would have been 
considered a symbol of national identity. 
 
The Laughable Madman  
The English translation of On the Genealogy of Morals was published in 1969. This was 
also the year P.E. Russell published his essay, “„Don Quixote‟ as a Funny Book,” a paper first 
presented at Oxford in 1967. I mention this because I suppose that wittingly or unwittingly, there 
is a relation between Nietzsche‟s interpretation of Don Quijote as a comic work and Russell‟s 
argument that the book was originally meant to be comical, as conceived by Nietzsche. Of Don 
Quijote Russell writes:  
 
It can hardly be denied that a great deal of it is concerned with describing tricks and 
hoaxes, with making sport of the protagonist, his squire, and many other characters—all 
this with the object of occasioning that boisterous laughter from the spectators which 
Cervantes so frequently describes. (312) 
 
From the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth, says Russell, Don Quijote, was 
read as a text of “joyful wisdom,” as Cervantes intended it (1977 I: 84; 1950 30). However, as 
Russell informs us, in 1954 “a distinguished Hispanist who undertook a new translation of Don 
Quixote into English explained that he had pruned away many chapters of Part II because „the 
element of unfeeling horseplay renders them somewhat distasteful to readers of today‟” (Op. cit. 
                                                 
1
The number that follows the # symbol refers to the aphorism. This will make it easier for the reader to locate the 
quote whether in the original or in translation, regardless of edition. 
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313). The Hispanist had, in the name of good morals, excised the “unfeeling” passages, because 
as he himself said, “readers of today” would have found them “distasteful” (Ibid). Ironically, 
these “readers of today” are the same nineteenth century, guilt-ridden readers that Nietzsche had 
accused of reading Don Quijote with a “bad conscience”—a book whose initial aim was 
poisoned with the morose seriousness of what Nietzsche termed, “the spirit of gravity.” Why not 
laugh at the madman?  “If one wants to consider Don Quixote as a funny book one must, 
inevitably also discuss Don Quixote‟s madness, for, as far as the knight is concerned, the fun—as 
Cervantes saw it—was inescapable from the madness,” argues Russell (313). The seventeenth 
century laughed at deformity, mental retardation, the toothless and the infirm, etc., and hence the 
court dwarfs of Velázquez Las meninas or the obese, naked little girl of Carreño‟s La monstrua 
desnuda. Russell writes:  
 
Cervantes and his contemporaries had views about what was funny which differed in 
various respects from ours. They believed that laughter and the ridiculous were provoked 
by some form of ugliness, of turpitudo, symbolized by the distorting mask worn by the 
players in ancient comedy. A deviation from the natural order of things lay at the root of 
the ridiculous. The deviation had to be of a kind that could not easily be eliminated 
though also, if it was to be laughable, it must be incapable of causing serious harm. It was 
on this basis that that age justified its view that insanity provided it was not too violent, 
was funny. (Ibid. 320-321) 
 
That the mad were laughed at seems from all historical accounts to have been a fact; but a fact 
that ceases to be so by the latter part of the seventeenth century, when the mad, as Foucault has 
so well documented, began to be incarcerated and medically categorized. One made fun of the 
local madman or madwoman, covered him or her in tarred feathers, and played all kinds of 
practical jokes on the witless subject, but one did not hide this person from the sight of others. 
The mad were part of the fabric of the society. This was in part due to economics. As a 
“member” of the middle class Cervantes‟ Don Quijote did not need to work.  
But as society was beginning to change from that of an agrarian, landed economy, where 
money was made from the land, to one where money was made from the sales of goods in the 
city squares, it became imperative that the self-employed subject—of which the pícaro is an 
example—would have to become a productive member of society.  “The new meanings assigned 
to poverty, and the importance accorded to the obligation to work and the ethical values 
surrounding it were ultimately determining factors in the experience of madness, transforming its 
meaning,” writes Foucault in The History of Madness (2006 77).2  Foucault continues: 
                                                 
2
Numerous were the essays published in Spain in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century on the question of 
poverty. At such time, poverty became an economic/epistemological problem, and therefore morally problematic. 
Among these treatises were Luis Vives‟ De subventione pauperum (1526), Fray Domingo de Soto‟s Deliberación en 
la causa de los pobres (1545), Miguel Giginta‟s Cadena de oro (1584), and the physician and poet, Cristóbal Pérez 
de Herrera‟s Discursos del amparo de los legítimos pobres (1598/1975; Discourses on the Protection of the Truly 
Poor).The debate centered around who was and was not legitimately poor; who truly deserved alms, and who lived 
off the money of those who worked. In the course of governing his island, Sancho clearly states: “es mi intención 
limpiar esta ínsula de todo género de gente vagamunda, holgazanes y mal entretenida; porque quiero que sepáis, 
amigos, que la gente baldía y perezosa es en la república los mesmo que los  zánganos  en las colmenas, que se 
comen la miel que las trabajadoras abejas hacen. Pienso favorecer a los labradores…”(Don Quijote-II 1977 391). [“I 
intend to cleanse this isle of every sort of impurity, and of your vagabond, idle and ill-conditioned persons. For I 
should like you to know, friends, that your vagrant and lazy sort are the same thing in a state as drones are in the 
hive, eating up the honey the workers make. I intend to favor labouring men…” (Don Quixote 1950 781)]. It is not 
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A new sensibility had been born: a line had been drawn, a threshold established, and its 
purpose was banishment. The society of the classical age  created a neutral zone in its 
own concrete space, a blank page where the real life of the city was suspended; order  
was no longer in free conflict with disorder, and reason no longer attempted to find its 
way through places that eluded it or refused it entry. Reason reigned in a pure manner, 
triumphantly, and victory over unchained reason was guaranteed in advance. Madness 
was denied the imaginary liberty that still allowed it to flourish at the time of the 
Renaissance. Not so long ago it was still visible in the light of day, as in King Lear or 
Don Quixote, but in the space of  less than half a century it found itself a recluse in the 
fortress of confinement, bound to Reason, to the rules of morality and the their 
monotonous nights. (Ibid) 
 
In other words, the moment we became “humanists,” concerned with the plight and treatment of 
the mad, the moment we stopped laughing at the Don Quijotes of the world, cruel as that was, 
was also the moment we began to lack them up in darkened rooms, away from everyone‟s sight 
to spare us the embarrassment of their insanity. Today we medicate the schizophrenic, take away 
his/her hallucinations, and return him/her to the world: a productive member of society, bound to 
the rules of Reason and the work ethic. And thus while Nietzsche‟s “frog perspective” points to 
the banality that all interpretations are historically determined (e.g. Borges‟ “Pierre Menard”),3 
such perspectivism is more significantly a reminder that the subject of laughter—the matter of 
Cervantes‟ masterpiece—to the extent that it is a construct of history, is first and foremost a 





 Caroline Picart argues in her essay, “Nietzsche as Masked Romantic,” that despite 
Nietzsche‟s criticism of German Romanticism, Nietzsche‟s was very much a Romantic thinker. 
Among the seven “persistent romantic” qualities Picart claims to have influenced Nietzsche‟s 
thinking was that of “a consuming aspiration to be able to command both nature and especially 
the self, even to the point of the sacrifice of one‟s life for the sake of ideals” (1997 288)—a 
quality that Nietzsche attributed to the character of Don Quijote, with whom he identified 
himself. In Daybreak, Nietzsche went as far as to identify Don Quijote with the Christ who 
having been sacrificed for the sins of men exclaimed: “„my God, why hast thou forsaken me!‟” 
                                                                                                                                                             
to be wondered, then, that the madness of Don Quijote is tacitly the product of his idleness, the same idleness that 
Cervantes will impute to his comfortable, “desocupado lector,”on the very first page of the novel. The once praised 
otium of the medieval imaginary was now put into question by by the ethos of the Reformation. 
3
Not in spite of but rather precisely because of his metaphysical posturings, Borges is a comic writer; and the joke of 
“Pierre Menard” is that he has presented his readers with a mirror image of their own internal time consciousness, 
which they have interpreted, much like the earthlings of Lem‟s Solaris, to be transcendental. The Pierre Menard of 
the story is a place holder--an x which can be exchanged for any other x, as it happens with the race and ethnicity of 
racial and ethnic jokes that are readily interchangeable to fit the circumstances. 
4“[T]here is no such thing as a moral fact,” writes Nietzsche in Twilight of the Idols. “Moral sentiment has this in 
common with religious sentiment: it believes in realities which do not exist. Morality is only an interpretation of 
certain phenomena, or, more definitely, a misinterpretation of them” (2004 #1: 30). And Alexander Nehamas 
observes: “Where others had previously seen merely a natural development of natural human needs, desires, and 
relationships…Nietzsche saw instead what he described as a system of signs. Such a system, naturally, like all 
systems of signs, remains incomprehensible until we know what its signs are signs of and signs for. In order, then, to 
show that morality can be interpreted, Nietzsche actually interprets it; and his interpretation involves a 
demonstration that morality itself is an interpretation to begin with” (2006 59). 
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(1997 #114: 70). Walter Kaufmann, once Nietzsche‟s best known interpreter, says in his book, 
Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, that “Nietzsche loved Don Quixote… [and 
censured] Cervantes for having made his hero look ridiculous…” (1968 71, note 40).5  This was 
the Nietzsche who once pronounced that “one had to be willing to be a buffoon if one desired to 
be a philosopher;” the Nietzsche who viewed his earlier philological studies, as “a magnificent 
example of Don Quixotism,‟” and claimed in an unpublished note cited by Kaufman: “„[Don 
Quixotism] is what all philology is at best…One imitates a mere chimera…which has never 
existed‟” (Ibid).  Whereas of Cervantes‟ treatment of his protagonist, he wrote:  
 
Cervantes could have fought the Inquisition, but he preferred to make its victims, i.e., its 
heretics and idealists of all kinds, look ridiculous. (Ibid) 
 
Yet, what is worse, and unforgivable for Nietzsche is that Cervantes could not even “spare his 
hero the dreadful illumination about his own state” at the end of the novel.6  Instead Don Quijote 
is made the laughingstock of everyone around him as he takes his last breath, and the epitaph 
placed upon his grave by Sansón Carrasco, cruelly reads:  
 
  Fue el espantajo y el coco 
  del mundo, en tal coyuntura, 
  que acreditó su ventura, 
  morir cuerdo y vivir loco. (Don Quijote 1977, II, 577) 
  […as a scarecrow in men‟s eyes 
  He lived, and was their bugbear too; 
  And had the luck with much ado, 
  To live a fool, and yet die wise]  (Don Quixote 1950, 939)  
“Cervantes‟ choice of descriptive terms for Don Quixote here could hardly be more derisive,” 
writes P. E. Russell (1969 324) in response to the epitaph just cited in the last chapter (Part II) of 
                                                 
5
In Nietzsche en España, Gonzalo Sobejano cites Clarín and the journalist, Francisco Navarro Ledesma, for equating 
“el loco alemán” with Cervantes‟ other well-known madman, El licencidado vidriera (1967 467, 469).  Navarro‟s 
notion, however, that Cervantes‟ Vidriera anticipated Nietzsche‟s ubermensch, couldn‟t be further from the German 
philosopher‟s idea of the overman. For while Nietzsche—as did Unamuno later on (Ibid. 298)--may have seen some 
tacit analogy between Don Quijote and Zarathustra qua wandering warriors of a revaluation of values, I fail to see 
what would have made Nietzsche conceive of Vidriera as  “la imagen del superhombre” (Ibid. 469) [the image of 
the superman]. As Sobejano demonstrated almost half a century ago, Nietzsche‟s thought influenced almost all the 
great writers of the ‟98 generation and beyond; but at times it did so in ways that Nietzsche would have found less 
than salutary. Unamuno tried as best he could to accommodate Nietzsche‟s anti-Christianity within Spanish 
Catholicism, and Ramiro de Maeztu looked to Nietzsche for models for a nationalist project (Ibid. 328)—two of the 
very things that Nietzsche railed against: Christianity and nationalism, the combination of which constituted 
Nietzsche‟s worst nightmare. What is worse: though these Spanish writers used Nietzsche to establish all kinds of 
analogies, as for example, between Cervantes, Don Quijote, and Nietzschean philosophy, none seem to have taken 
the time to read what Nietzsche himself had to say about either Cervantes or Don Quijote, or for that matter, about 
Spain. 
6
Here Alonso Quijano asks Sancho forgiveness for having included him in his madness. “Perdóname, amigo, de la 
ocasión que te he dado de parecer loco como yo, haciéndote caer en el error en que yo he caído, de que hubo y hay 
caballeros andantes en el mundo…Yo fui loco, y ya soy cuerdo: fui don Don Quijote de la Mancha, y soy 
agora…Alonso Quijano el Bueno” (Don Quijote-II 1977 575, 576); [“Pardon me, friend, that I caused you to appear 
mad, like me, making you fall into the same sort of error as myself, the belief that there were and still are knights 
errant in the world...I was mad, but I am sane now. I was Don Quijote de la Mancha, but to-day, as I have said, I am 
Alonso Quixano the Good”] (Don Quixote 1950 937, 938). 
Rolando Pérez  173 
 
ISSN 1540 5877  eHumanista 30 (2015): 168-175 
the novel. The words “coco,” Russell explains, “belonged to the language of children and was 
used to describe something that frightened,” and “espantajo,” besides meaning scarecrow, 
“described [according to Covarrubias] someone who, at first sight, seemed to merit respect but 
turned out to be undeserving of it because he lacked real substance” (Ibid. 324-325). Nothing, 
following a careful study of both parts of the novel, argues Russell, suggests that “Cervantes 
himself thought of his book—except of course, for those sections in which the knight and his 
squire are temporarily put on one side—as anything other than a funny book” (Ibid. 324). If that 
is the case, then we have to ask: why it is that Nietzsche objects, as he does, to Cervantes‟ 
treatment of his hero? Why is it that Nietzsche finds Cervantes‟ mockery of Don Quijote 
objectionable when, in the same breath, he tells us, that “cruelty is one of the oldest festive joys 
of mankind” (1997 #18 16)? Or when he suggests that seventeenth century readers of the novel 
laughed at the protagonist‟s insane actions with a “good conscience” (1969 #6: 66)? I believe the 
answer lies in the morally ambiguous nature of laughter itself.  Rather than simplify our 
understanding of laughter, Nietzsche problematizes it by making it the object of a genealogy of 
morals: presented as a mirror of what we are when we are morally strong and what we are when 
are morally weak.  
In an important essay of 1897, entitled “The Psychology of Tickling, Laughing, and the 
Comic,” G. Stanley Hall and Arthur Allin write:7  
 
The practical joke is war, cruelty, torture reduced to the level and intensity of play, and 
must not transcend its bounds. To give and take in jest what was once the wager of life 
and death, marks a distinct though late recapitulatory state of the development of the soul. 
It is the culture of religion, art, literature, education, and civilization generally which has 
reduced these fierce and often brutal propensities, and that probably chiefly within the 
historic period, to their present harmless forms. (23-24). 
 
This, I think, is Nietzsche‟s point when he writes: “Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over the 
affects, the whole somber thing called reflection, all these prerogatives and showpieces of man: 
how dearly they have been bought! how much blood and cruelty is at the bottom of all „good 
things‟” (1969 #4 62) that go by the name of civilization! 
 
Conclusion 
 Nietzsche reads Don Quijote as a text that reflects a moment of transition between the 
Middle Ages and modernity. And while I do not completely agree with Professor Picart that 
Nietzsche was a “masked Romantic,” I do believe that not unlike Cervantes, Nietzsche was a 
thinker caught at the crossroads of modernity‟s (bourgeois) “Romanticism” and the Greek, 
Dionysian world of his Quixotean readings. That he viewed Don Quijote‟s individualist idealism 
as the opposite of “herd morality” (1966 #202: 115-116), with slightly more than a touch of 
Romantic admiration, should not surprise us, but neither should it surprise us that he found Don 
Quijote‟s madness laughable: because for Nietzsche the question was not one of a return to the 
past, but of a dangerous journey forward, tempered with an understanding of history.
8
 Some day, 
                                                 
7This essay, published four years before Nietzsche‟s death already cites Nietzsche‟s anti-Christian psychology of 
pity (21) 
8
Aptly, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche wrote: “In late ages that may be proud of their humanity, so much fear 
remains, so much superstitious fear of the „savage cruel beast‟ whose conquest is the very pride of these more 
humane ages, that even palpable truths remain unspoken for centuries, as if by some agreement, because they look 
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he suggested we would have to write a history of the senses, a history of the body; and some day, 
he may equally have suggested, we will have to write a history of laughter, which clearly, will 
also be a history of our cruelty, of all our Abu Ghraibs.
9
 
                                                                                                                                                             
as if they might reanimate that savage beast one has finally „mortified.‟ Perhaps I dare something when I let one of 
these truths slip out…We should reconsider cruelty and open our eyes….That „savage animal‟ has really not been 
„mortified, it lives and it flourishes…” (1966 #229: 158). 
9
In an attempt to make light of the torture and humiliations inflicted on Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers in Abu 
Ghraib, conservative radio personality, Rush Limbaugh likened the tortures captured in the photographs to mere 
“pranks,” and college “hazings.”  But what if we reverse his logic and liken the “light hearted,” “festive” college 
“hazings” across America to the tortures of Abu Ghraib? After all, nothing prevents us from doing so; for if A = B, 
then B has to be equal to A. 
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